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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court sustained the Federal Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 20101 based on Chief Justice John G.
Roberts, Jr.’s majority opinion in National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius.2 The decision was feted by President Obama, liberal
politicians, activists, and citizens who feared the Supreme Court would use
its judicial review powers to invalidate the signature achievement of the
* Assistant Professor of Law, Duncan School of Law, Lincoln Memorial University. Professor
Faizer would like to thank his darling wife Melanie for her edits and loving support. He would also like to
thank Jordan Gilbertson, Student Services Librarian, with her help with this publication and Dean Sydney
Beckman of the Duncan School of Law.
1. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119.
2. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
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United States’ forty-fourth President. Unsurprisingly, the decision
disappointed many conservatives, who expected the Court to exercise its
judicial review power to invalidate what is arguably the most important and
ambitious piece of federal social welfare legislation signed into law by any
President since the Great Society Era. The Act is very unpopular with
conservatives and right-wing media pundits because it was signed into law
by a Democratic President in a country with increasingly pronounced
partisan political cleavages and because it substantially reallocates resources
in an industry that already consumes nearly one-fifth of the nation’s gross
domestic product. 3 Opponents of the Act seized on the “individual
mandate,” which requires federal income tax-paying individuals to “ensure
that the individual, and any dependent of the individual who is an applicable
individual, is covered under minimum essential coverage . . . from private
health insurance companies 4 or pay what the Act describes as a “shared
responsibility payment” or “penalty” directly to the Internal Revenue Service
of the United States Treasury Department (“IRS”).5
Although Chief Justice Roberts has come under attack from select
conservatives for upholding the Act from a constitutional challenge brought
by a collection of plaintiffs that includes 26 states, I argue that his majority
decision effectively hamstrings the federal government’s power in a manner
consistent with both conservatism and federalism because Congress will now
have less power to both enact social welfare legislation and require States to
comply with the implementation of federally-funded programs. Moreover,
since Chief Justice Roberts’s decision to uphold the Act greatly pleased the
President, liberal politicians, activists, and citizens, the decision shrewdly
narrows the federal government’s powers while enhancing the Court’s
reputation with the center-left of the American political culture. Thus, it
safeguarded the Court’s institutional prestige. In short, Chief Justice
Roberts’s decision is reminiscent of our greatest Chief Justice’s decision in
Marbury v. Madison.6 Like Chief Justice John Marshall, who earned the
Jefferson Administration’s acquiescence in a decision that established the
Court’s judicial review power and presaged the judiciary’s current status as
an equal branch of government, Chief Justice Roberts avoided a
confrontation with the Obama Administration, enhanced the Court’s
standing, and articulated a decision that greatly narrows the national
government’s power under both the Commerce Clause and the Tenth
Amendment. He did this by shrewdly finding a means of sustaining the Act
while articulating a jurisprudence that is activist, conservative, and federalist.
3. Policy Basics: Where Do Our Federal Tax Dollars Go?, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY BASICS
(Aug. 13, 2012), http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=1258.
4. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2010).
5. Id. § 5000A(b)(1).
6. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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II. THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT OF 2010
The Act was passed by both houses of Congress and signed into law by
President Obama in 2010 after a highly bruising debate that many pundits
believe cost Democratic Party control of the House of Representatives and
Nancy Pelosi her position as House Speaker after the November 2010
mid-term elections.7 Chief Justice Roberts, in describing the Act, writes:
The Act aims to increase the number of Americans covered by
health insurance and decrease the cost of health care. The Act's
10 titles stretch over 900 pages and contain hundreds of
provisions. This case concerns constitutional challenges to two
key provisions, commonly referred to as the individual mandate
and the Medicaid expansion.8
A. The Individual’s Role
In describing the individual mandate, Chief Justice Roberts writes:
The individual mandate requires most Americans to maintain
“minimum essential” health insurance coverage. The mandate
does not apply to some individuals, such as prisoners and
undocumented aliens. Many individuals will receive the required
coverage through their employer, or from a government program
such as Medicaid or Medicare. But for individuals who are not
exempt and do not receive health insurance through a third party,
the means of satisfying the requirement is to purchase insurance
from a private company.9
According to the Act, those who fail to purchase insurance must pay a
“shared responsibility payment” or “penalty” to the IRS that is calculated as
a percentage of household income.10 Chief Justice Roberts writes that the
“shared responsibility payment” is:
[S]ubject to a floor based on a specified dollar amount and a
ceiling based on the average annual premium the individual
would have to pay for qualifying private health insurance. In
7. See Jay Cost, Health Care Reform Has Endangered the Democratic Majority, REAL CLEAR
POLITICS
HORSE
RACE
BLOG
(Aug.
31,
2010,
12:00
AM),
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/horseraceblog/2010/08/health_care_reform_has_endange_1.html.
8. Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. at 2580.
9. Id. (internal citations omitted).
10. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b)(1), (c).
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2016, for example, the penalty will be 2.5 percent of an
individual's household income, but no less than $695 and no more
than the average yearly premium for insurance that covers 60
percent of the cost of 10 specified services (e.g., prescription
drugs and hospitalization). The Act provides that the penalty will
be paid to the Internal Revenue Service with an individual's taxes,
and “shall be assessed and collected in the same manner” as tax
penalties, such as the penalty for claiming too large an income tax
refund. The Act, however, bars the IRS from using several of its
normal enforcement tools, such as criminal prosecutions and
levies. And some individuals who are subject to the mandate are
nonetheless exempt from the penalty—for example, those with
income below a certain threshold and members of Indian tribes.11
In short, the Act’s individual mandate requires those with incomes that
subject them to the federal income tax to either purchase basic health
insurance, or make a payment to the IRS when filing their tax returns.12 The
individual mandate was initially resisted by the Obama Administration, but it
was eventually included because the Act prevents insurers from either
denying insurance coverage or charging higher insurance premiums to
individuals with preexisting conditions.13 This would, absent the individual
mandate, incentivize individuals to delay health insurance purchases until
absolutely necessary. Justice Ginsburg, in dissent, writes:
The minimum coverage provision is thus “an essential par[t] of a
larger regulation of economic activity”; without the provision,
“the regulatory scheme would be undercut.” Put differently, the
minimum coverage provision, together with the guaranteed-issue
and community-rating requirements, is “‘reasonably adapted’ to
the attainment of a legitimate end under the commerce power”:
the elimination of pricing and sales practices that take an
applicant's medical history into account.14
In effect, the Act’s most popular requirement—that insurance companies
will no longer either deny coverage or charge higher insurance premiums to

11. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2580 (internal citations omitted).
12. Id.
13. Ezra Klein, There Was a Reason Conservatives Once Supported the Individual Mandate, WASH.
POST WONKBLOG (Mar. 31, 2012, 9:00 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezraklein/post/there-was-a-reason-conservatives-once-supported-the-individualmandate/2012/03/31/gIQAiddnlS_blog.html.
14. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2626 (quoting Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 24–25, 37 (2005) (Scalia, J.
concurring)) (internal citations omitted).

2013

CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN “MARSHALL” ROBERTS

5

those with preexisting conditions—necessitated its least popular and most
controversial provision: the individual mandate.
B. The Several States’ Role
The Act’s Medicaid expansion requires States to increase their Medicaid
rolls to cover all individuals under 65 years of age whose incomes are below
133% of federal poverty levels by the year 2014.15 The federal government
will cover 100% of the cost of this Medicaid expansion through the year
2016 and gradually reduce the subsidy until it is no less than 90% of the
program cost.16 Under the Act, States refusing to participate in the Medicaid
expansion may lose the entirety of their existing federal Medicaid subsidies,
a provision that may leave the States with no alternative but to participate.17
The Act seeks to approximate universal health insurance in the United
States by greatly expanding Medicaid eligibility at the State level, providing
federal insurance subsidies to individuals (not discussed in the decision),
disallowing insurance companies from either refusing to cover or charging
higher premiums to individuals with preexisting medical conditions, and
facilitating this regulation’s implementation while ostensibly reducing the
cost of health insurance for the rest of the American population by way of the
individual mandate.
III. REACTIONS TO ORAL ARGUMENT
Oral Argument on the Act’s constitutionality was held from March 26–
28, 2012 at the Supreme Court. Court “watchers” immediately forecasted a
negative outcome for the United States and Solicitor General Donald B.
Verrilli, Jr. The CNN and New Yorker Magazine Supreme Court analyst,
Jeffrey Toobin, called Mr. Verrilli’s oral argument before the Court “a train
wreck for the Obama Administration” and predicted the individual mandate
would be stricken as unconstitutional.18 In an article that appeared in the
May 10, 2012 New York Review of Books, the late Ronald Dworkin writes:
Analysts at first predicted a 7–2 decision rejecting the challenge.
But they apparently misjudged the dedication of the
ultraconservative justices, whose questions in the oral argument
15. Id. at 2601. Presently, States, on average, cover employed parents who earn up to 63% of federal
poverty guidelines.
16. Id. at 2601.
17. Id. at 2657.
18. CNN’s Jeffrey Toobin Calls David Verilli’s Oral Argument Before the Supreme Court Tuesday a
Train Wreck for the Obama Administration, STROKES OF CANDOR (Mar. 27, 2012),
http://strokesofcandor.com/us-politics/cnns-jeffrey-toobin-calls-verilli-oral-argument-before-supremecourt-a-train-wreck-for-obama/.
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have now convinced many commentators that on the contrary, in
spite of text precedent, and principle, the Court will declare the
act unconstitutional in June, by a 5–4 vote.19
These early predictions were based on both the overall tenor of the oral
argument and by the questions posed by Associate Justice Anthony Kennedy,
seen by many as the Court’s only “swing vote” since the resignation of
former Associate Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, who was replaced by the
more conservative Samuel A. Alito, Jr. Professor Dworkin writes, “There is
still reason to hope . . . that Justice Anthony Kennedy, often the swing vote
between liberals and ultraconservatives, will have sufficient respect for
congressional authority to save the act.”20
Following the oral argument, President Obama, at an April 1, 2012 joint
White House press conference with both Mexican President Felipe Calderon
and Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper, stated:
Ultimately, I am confident that the Supreme Court will not take
what would be an unprecedented, extraordinary step of
overturning a law that was passed by a strong majority of a
democratically elected Congress . . . .
...
And I'd just remind conservative commentators that, for years,
what we have heard is, the biggest problem on the bench was
judicial activism, or a lack of judicial restraint, that an unelected
group of people would somehow overturn a duly constituted and
passed law . . . Well, this is a good example, and I'm pretty
confident that this court will recognize that and not take that
step[.]21
He made these comments despairing that the Act may not survive
judicial review. Some conservatives interpreted President Obama’s remarks
as intimidation and a veiled threat to attack the Court in the forthcoming
election should the Act be overturned.22 In fact, since the Court’s recent
19. Ronald Dworkin, Why the Mandate is Constitutional: The Real Argument, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS,
May 10, 2012, at 4, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2012/may/10/why-mandateconstitutional-real-argument/?pagination=false.
20. Id.
21. Jeff Mason, Obama Takes a Shot at Supreme Court Over Healthcare, REUTERS (Apr. 2, 2012, 6:45
PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/02/us-obama-healthcare-idUSBRE8310WP20120402.
22. Ruth Marcus, Op. Ed., Obama’s unsettling attack on the Supreme Court, WASH. POST (Apr. 2,
2012, 5:45 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/post/obamas-unsettling-attack-onthe-supreme-court/2012/04/02/gIQA4BXYrS_blog.html.
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decisions of Bush v. Gore 23 and Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission, 24 many on the American left, including the President,
bemoaned what they perceived to be the Court’s partisan use of judicial
activism to move the country in a rightward political direction.25
These liberal sentiments were heightened after oral argument because the
use of judicial review to invalidate the Act would have been the first use of
this power since the New Deal era to invalidate a president’s signature piece
of domestic legislation. Unlike other statutes previously invalidated by the
Court’s judicial review, the Act consumed the entire political culture for
nearly two years at great political cost. In effect, had the Act been stricken, it
risked further delegitimizing the Court in the eyes of progressives and
liberals, and politicizing the Court’s legitimacy in advance of the November
2012 general election.
An immediate dilemma confronted the Chief Justice Roberts: sustain the
Act in a manner that endorsed the Obama Administration’s position or assert
his constitutional jurisprudence at the risk of politically damaging the Court.
As set forth more fully below, he did neither. Chief Justice Roberts’s adept
maneuvering around the problem brings to mind the country’s greatest chief
justice, Chief Justice Marshall, who, with the acquiescence of the national
government’s political branches, created the Court’s judicial review power.
IV. THE CREATION OF THE COURT’S JUDICIAL REVIEW POWER
When the Federalist Virginian, John Marshall, was appointed Chief
Justice by President John Adams, the Court was seen as the weakest of the
three branches of government and lacked the authority to invalidate
unconstitutional acts of Congress. The Constitution’s text evidenced the
Founders’ relatively low opinion of the Court. For example, Article III,
Section One allows the Congress to disestablish all inferior federal courts if it
so chooses and Article III, Section Two allows the Congress to pass
legislation limiting the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction.
Chief Justice Marshall’s genius in Marbury26 was to earn the Jefferson
Administration’s acquiescence in a decision that established the Court’s
judicial review power and adumbrated the judiciary’s eventual status as an
equal branch of the national government.

23. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
24. 558 U.S. 50 (2010).
25. William Galston, Don’t Campaign Against the Supreme Court, Mr. President, NEW REPUBLIC,
Apr. 5, 2012, http://www.tnr.com/article/the-vital-center/102372/obama-supreme-court-campaign-issuescotus.
26. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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A. Marbury v. Madison
The fiercely contested 1800 Presidential election resulted in Thomas
Jefferson defeating the incumbent, Federalist John Adams. 27
Notwithstanding this result, the defeated incumbent, Adams, in January
1801, nominated his Secretary of State, John Marshall, to serve as United
States Chief Justice. 28 Marshall, a Federalist like Adams, sought to
strengthen the Federalist position as much as possible before the Republican
Jefferson Administration took office in March 1801.29
On February 13, 1801, Congress passed and President Adams signed the
Circuit Judge Act that reduced the number of Supreme Court justices from
six to five, thereby decreasing the opportunity for Republican control of the
Court because the retirement of two Court justices was now required before
President-elect Jefferson could make any Court appointments.30
On February 27, 1801, less than a week before Adams’ Presidential term
ended, Congress adopted the Organic Act of the District of Columbia that
authorized President Adams to appoint 42 justices of the peace.31 Adams
announced and the Senate confirmed his nominations in the days preceding
Jefferson’s March 1801 inauguration as President.32
Justice Marshall, acting as Secretary of State, signed the commissions
and dispatched his brother, James Marshall, to effectuate delivery.33 A few
commissions, including one for William Marbury, were not delivered before
Jefferson’s inauguration and when President Jefferson took office, he
instructed the incoming Secretary of State, James Madison, to withhold the
remaining commissions.34 Marbury, feeling wronged, filed suit in the United
States Supreme Court under the Judiciary Act of 1798, seeking a writ of
mandamus to compel Madison to complete delivery of his commission. 35
The Court heard the case in 1803.36
If Chief Justice Marshall’s goal was to merely adjudicate the case, he
could have denied Marbury’s request on legality principal grounds because
the Judiciary Act unconstitutionally gave him standing to commence suit in
the Court. Instead, in an ingenious decision that created the Court’s judicial
review power, Chief Justice Marshall concluded that Marbury was entitled to
the commission and that President Jefferson was wrong to deny it to him.
However, he refused Marbury’s request for the commission because he
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 37–45 (4th ed. 2011).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 27.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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concluded the Judiciary Act unconstitutionally gave the Court original
jurisdiction to hear a mandamus proceeding when such authority is nowhere
found in the Constitution’s Article III. He concluded the Court can only hear
original cases enumerated in the Constitution’s text and this original
jurisdiction could not be expanded by a statute such as the Judiciary Act.37 Is
this a correct interpretation of Article III? Probably not, except Chief Justice
Marshall’s genius was to know the Jefferson Administration would disregard
any decision in Marbury’s favor and this would permanently undermine the
Court’s prestige.38
By concluding that Marbury was entitled to the commission, yet had no
means of redress before the Court, Justice Marshall ingeniously established
the Court’s judicial review power over both executive and legislative actions
in a manner acceptable to the Jefferson Administration.39
Chief Justice Marshall, however, knew that an extensive use of judicial
review would risk undermining the Court’s authority. 40 Indeed, Marbury
was the only case in which Chief Justice Marshall invoked the Court’s
judicial review power to invalidate a Congressional statute until Chief Justice
Taney invalidated the Missouri Compromise in Dred Scott.41
V. CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS’S DECISION
The Court heard oral argument on the Act’s constitutionality in a
politically charged and polarized environment that has characterized postCold War America. Problems related to the partisan environment were
compounded by an overall drop in the Court’s approval ratings with the
American public, from 66% in the late 1980s to 44% in June 2012.42 Chief
Justice Roberts might have attributed this drop in popularity, in part, to a
perception among progressives that it had actively used its judicial review
powers in a manner favoring the Republican Party.43 Indeed, during his 2010
State of the Union Address to both Houses of Congress, President Obama,
expressing his disagreement with Citizens United, said the decision will
“open the floodgates for special interests—including foreign companies—to
spend without limit in our elections . . . I don’t think American elections
37. Id.
38. Id. I recognize the Kansas Nebraska Act of 1854 had the effect of repealing the Missouri
Compromise notwithstanding Chief Justice Taney’s decision.
39. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 27.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Adam Liptak & Allison Kopocki, Approval Rating for Justices Hits Just 44% in New Poll, N.Y.
TIMES, June 7, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/08/us/politics/44-percent-of-americans-approveof-supreme-court-in-new-poll.html?pagewanted=all.
43. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 310 (invalidating much of the McCain-Feingold campaign finance
law); Bush, 531 U.S. at 98 (ending the Florida vote recount and thereby deciding the 2000 Presidential
election).
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should be bankrolled by America’s most powerful interests.”44 He went on
to urge Congress to “pass a bill that helps correct some of these problems.”45
Recognizing the risk of an election campaign that attacked the Court’s
legitimacy, Chief Justice Roberts, like Chief Justice Marshall before him,
found an ingenious means of both strengthening the Court’s institutional
prestige and furthering his jurisprudential goals. This was not necessarily
Chief Justice Roberts’s position from the inception. Might his decision have
been different if the President himself did not signal his intention to politicize
the Court’s jurisprudence in the forthcoming Presidential election? Also, to
what degree was his decision to uphold the Act prompted by the relative
extremism of the Court’s four remaining conservative justices, whose joint
dissent would have invalidated the entire Act?46 CBS News’ Jan Crawford
reported the Chief Justice Roberts initially voted in chambers to strike down
the individual mandate but then changed his mind and refused the
conservative bloc of associate justices’ repeated overtures to join their
decision and invalidate the entire Act. 47
Indeed, if the Chief Justice’s goal was to merely uphold the Act, he need
only, on legality principal grounds, have discussed the constitutionality of the
individual mandate under Congress’s Taxing and Spending Power and
avoided mention of Congress’s power to pass the Act under the Commerce
Clause. By issuing a decision invalidating the Act under the Commerce
Clause, upholding the Act under the Taxing and Spending Clause and then
narrowing the national government’s powers vis a vis the several States by
enlarging the meaning of Tenth Amendment, the Chief Justice avoided a
direct confrontation with the Obama Administration, solidified the Court’s
prestige with the American public, and articulated a jurisprudence that is
activist, conservative, and federalist. Like his greatest predecessor in
Marbury, the Chief Justice co-opted the executive in a decision that both
enhances the Court’s institutional prestige and furthers his jurisprudential
objectives.
A. The Decision Concludes the Individual Mandate is Unconstitutional
Under the Commerce Clause
Chief Justice Roberts’s decision commenced with a detailed explanation
as to why the Act did not pass the Commerce Clause test. This explains why
44. Linda Greenhouse, Opinionator, Justice Alito’s Reaction, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2010, 11:18 PM),
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/27/justice-alitos-reaction/.
45. Id.
46. Linda Greenhouse, Opinionator, The Mystery of John Roberts, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 11, 2010, 9:00
PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/11/the-mystery-of-john-roberts/?hp.
47. Jan Crawford, Roberts Switched Views to Uphold Health Care Law, FACE THE NATION (July 1, 2012
1:29 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-3460_162-57464549/roberts-switched-views-to-uphold-healthcare-law/.
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many news organizations such as CNN and Fox News initially incorrectly
reported that the Act was invalidated by Chief Justice Roberts’s majority
decision. In particular, the decision reads as follows:
The individual mandate, however, does not regulate existing
commercial activity. It instead compels individuals to become
active in commerce by purchasing a product, on the ground that
their failure to do so affects interstate commerce. Construing the
Commerce Clause to permit Congress to regulate individuals
precisely because they are doing nothing would open a new and
potentially vast domain to congressional authority. Every day
individuals do not do an infinite number of things. In some cases
they decide not to do something; in others they simply fail to do
it. Allowing Congress to justify federal regulation by pointing to
the effect of inaction on commerce would bring countless
decisions an individual could potentially make within the scope
of federal regulation, and—under the Government's theory—
empower Congress to make those decisions for him.48
It is noteworthy how this statement is not supported by any legal authority.
Instead, Chief Justice Roberts tortuously tries to distinguish the
constitutionality of the individual mandate under the Commerce Clause from
the Court’s 1942 decision in Wickard v. Filburn,49 which held that Congress
had Commerce Clause authority to limit the quantity of wheat that farmers
could grow for non-commercial consumption.50 The Chief Justice writes:
Wickard has long been regarded as “perhaps the most far reaching
example of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity,”
but the Government's theory in this case would go much further.
Under Wickard it is within Congress' power to regulate the
market for wheat by supporting its price. But price can be
supported by increasing demand as well as by decreasing supply.
The aggregated decisions of some consumers not to purchase
wheat have a substantial effect on the price of wheat, just as
decisions not to purchase health insurance have on the price of
insurance. Congress can therefore command that those not
buying wheat do so, just as it argues here that it may command
that those not buying health insurance do so. The farmer in
Wickard was at least actively engaged in the production of wheat,
and the Government could regulate that activity because of its
48. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2587.
49. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
50. Id. at 128–29.
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effect on commerce. The Government's theory here would
effectively override that limitation, by establishing that
individuals may be regulated under the Commerce Clause
whenever enough of them are not doing something the
Government would have them do.51
This statement shows no deference to Congressional findings and disregards
the reality that all Americans consume health care, regardless of their
insurance status.
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent discusses how Chief Justice Roberts’s
Commerce Clause jurisprudence is both a marked departure from the Court’s
prior precedent and contrary to her understanding of the framers’ intent,
which never limited Congressional jurisdiction only to those “actively
engaged in commercial transactions.”52 She notes that unlike the relevant
provision of the Agricultural Adjustment Act at issue in Wickard and the
Controlled Substances Act in Gonzales v. Raich, 53 “Congress’ actions are
even more rational in this case, where the future activity (the consumption of
medical care) is certain to occur, the sole uncertainty being the time the
activity will take place.”54
Unlike Chief Justice Roberts and the four dissenting conservative
associate justices, Justice Ginsburg’s dissent makes a plea for judicial
restraint and argues the proper check on Congressional power under the
Commerce Clause should be political and not judicial.55 Unlike liberals who
have lauded Chief Justice Roberts’s decision to uphold the Act, Justice
Ginsburg criticizes the decision from the perspective of a liberal jurist
concerned with the national government’s future capacity to enact social
welfare legislation.56
Rebutting Chief Justice Roberts and the conservative justices’ claim that
the Act’s survival under the Commerce Clause would provide the federal
government with unlimited regulatory power, Justice Ginsberg writes that the
Act does not mandate the purchase of an unwanted product:
Rather, Congress is merely defining the terms on which
individuals pay for an interstate good they consume: Persons
subject to the mandate must now pay for medical care in advance
(instead of at the point of service) and through insurance (instead
of out of pocket). Establishing payment terms for goods in or

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2617 (internal citations omitted) (quoting U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)).
Id. at 2621 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See 545 U.S. 1, 7 (2005).
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2619 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See id. at 2614–15.
See id. at 2609.
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affecting interstate commerce is quintessential
regulation well within Congress’s domain.57

economic

Justice Ginsberg’s dissent, in the end, rebuts Chief Justice Roberts’s claimed
distinction between economic activity and inactivity by describing an
individual’s decision not to purchase insurance as a choice to remain selfinsured, which, in turn, is an economic decision.58
Indeed, Justice Ginsburg notes Chief Justice Roberts’s interpretation of
the Commerce Clause will have baneful consequences for national welfare
because States cannot resolve the problem on their own and because doing so
would place them at a competitive disadvantage as compared with
neighboring States. She writes:
Like Social Security benefits, a universal health-care system, if
adopted by an individual State, would be “bait to the needy and
dependent elsewhere, encouraging them to migrate and seek a
haven of repose.” An influx of unhealthy individuals into a State
with universal health care would result in increased spending on
medical services. To cover the increased costs, a State would
have to raise taxes, and private health-insurance companies would
have to increase premiums. Higher taxes and increased insurance
costs would, in turn, encourage businesses and healthy
individuals to leave the State.59
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent demonstrates how the Chief Justice’s decision was
nothing less than an activist limitation on the scope of Congressional power
under the Commerce Clause.
Why did the Chief Justice choose to narrow Congressional power under
the Commerce Clause while expanding its power under the Taxing and
Spending Clause? Was this choice justified?
B. The Act’s Constitutionality under the Taxing and Spending Clause
Chief Justice Roberts’s conclusion as to the Act’s constitutionality under
the Taxing and Spending Clause and unconstitutionality under the Commerce
Clause accomplished two things. First, it allowed the Chief Justice to avoid a
direct confrontation with the Obama Administration and ensure that the
Court’s legitimacy would not be at issue in the forthcoming Presidential
57. Id.; see also United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 118 (1942) (recognizing that
“Congress plainly has power to regulate the price of milk distributed through the medium of interstate
commerce”).
58. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2622 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 2612 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 644 (1937)).
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election. Second, and more importantly, it enabled Chief Justice Roberts to
obtain the Obama Administration’s acquiescence in a decision that greatly
narrows the federal government’s legislative power. This is because it is
easier for Congress to socialize the cost of its legislative enactments by way
of the Commerce Clause regulations than it is to pay for these programs via
tax increases and government spending. Fearing the political consequences
of this aspect of the Chief Justice’s decision, the Obama Administration’s
position remains that the mandate is a penalty and not a tax.60 Meanwhile,
Republican Party politicians, such as former Alaska Governor and former
Republican Vice-Presidential candidate, Sarah Palin, have accused President
Obama of lying about the individual mandate and imposing a tax on the
American public.61 Recognizing that Chief Justice Roberts’s decision greatly
limits the federal government’s power to enact social welfare legislation, the
esteemed conservative public intellectual and Washington Post columnist,
George F. Will, writes:
If the mandate had been upheld under the Commerce Clause, the
Supreme Court would have decisively construed this clause so
permissively as to give Congress an essentially unlimited police
power—the power to mandate, proscribe and regulate behavior
for whatever Congress deems a public benefit. Instead, the court
rejected the Obama administration’s Commerce Clause doctrine.
The court remains clearly committed to this previous holding:
“Under our written Constitution . . . the limitation of
congressional authority is not solely a matter of legislative grace.”
The court held that the mandate is constitutional only because
Congress could have identified its enforcement penalty as a tax.
The court thereby guaranteed that the argument ignited by the
mandate will continue as the principal fault line in our polity.62
Did Chief Justice Roberts properly treat the mandate as a tax when it is
never labeled as such in the legislation? Concerning the mandate’s penalty
provision, Chief Justice Roberts writes, “[the provision] makes going without
insurance just another thing the Government taxes, like buying gasoline or
earning income. And if the mandate is in effect just a tax hike on certain
60. See George Stephanopoulos, Despite Ruling, Jack Lew Refuses to Call Health Care Mandate a
Tax, ABC NEWS (July 1, 2012, 11:14 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/07/despite-rulingjack-lew-refuses-to-call-mandate-a-tax/.
61. See James Hohmann & Robin Bravender, Health Care Ruling: GOPers Pounce on SCOTUS Tax
Talk, POLITICO (June 28, 2012, 11:29 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0612/77972.html.
62. George F. Will, Op. Ed., Conservatives’ Consolation Prize, WASH. POST (June 28, 2012, 2:53 PM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/george-will-supreme-court-gives-conservatives-a-consolationprize/2012/06/28/gJQAWyhY9V_story.html.
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taxpayers who do not have health insurance, it may be within Congress's
constitutional power to tax.”63 He further writes:
The exaction the Affordable Care Act imposes on those without
health insurance looks like a tax in many respects. The “[s]hared
responsibility payment,” as the statute entitles it, is paid into the
Treasury by “taxpayer[s]” when they file their tax returns. It does
not apply to individuals who do not pay federal income taxes
because their household income is less than the filing threshold in
the Internal Revenue Code. For taxpayers who do owe the
payment, its amount is determined by such familiar factors as
taxable income, number of dependents, and joint filing status.
The requirement to pay is found in the Internal Revenue Code
and enforced by the IRS, which—as we previously explained—
must assess and collect it “in the same manner as taxes.” This
process yields the essential feature of any tax: it produces at least
some revenue for the Government. Indeed, the payment is
expected to raise about $4 billion per year by 2017.64
Notwithstanding the fact that the “shared responsibility payment” is never
labeled a tax in the Act’s text or legislative history, Chief Justice Roberts
calls it a tax because all penalties must be paid to the IRS in the same manner
as taxes. He further argues that the exaction is more akin to a tax than a
penalty because failure to purchase insurance is completely legal under the
Act 65 and because Congress estimates that approximately four million
individuals will choose to pay the exaction rather than purchase private
health insurance.66
However, the fact that payment is made to the IRS and enhances
government revenues does not resolve the issue of whether the mandate is a
tax. The Court had never previously changed legislation to place a tax label
on what the legislation itself describes as a penalty. The four conservative
associate justices, in dissent, write:

63. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2594.
64. Id. at 2594 (internal citations omitted).
65. See id. at 2596–97 (“Neither the Act nor any other law attaches negative legal consequences to not
buying health insurance, beyond requiring a payment to the IRS.”); accord Transcript of Oral Argument at
49–50, Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (Mar. 26, 2012) (No. 11-398) (petitioner
stating that if an individual chooses to pay the IRS rather than obtain health insurance, that individual has
complied with the law).
66. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2597 (majority opinion) (“That Congress apparently regards such extensive
failure to comply with the mandate as tolerable suggests that Congress did not think it was creating four
million outlaws. It suggests instead that the shared responsibility payment merely imposes a tax citizens
may lawfully choose to pay in lieu of buying health insurance.”).
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But we have never held—never—that a penalty imposed for
violation of the law was so trivial as to be in effect a tax. We
have never held that any exaction imposed for violation of the
law is an exercise of Congress' taxing power—even when the
statute calls it a tax, much less when (as here) the statute
repeatedly calls it a penalty. When an act “adopt[s] the criteria of
wrongdoing” and then imposes a monetary penalty as the
“principal consequence on those who transgress its standard,” it
creates a regulatory penalty, not a tax.67
Calling the exaction a tax cannot be justified solely because the payment is
made to the IRS. After all, it would have been ridiculous for the legislation
to require the penalty to be paid to a different administrative body, such as
the Department of Health and Human Services, when that body lacks the
IRS’s revenue raising capabilities and would be at an administrative
disadvantage in determining an individual’s eligibility for a penalty
exemption. The conservative dissenters write:
Against the mountain of evidence that the minimum coverage
requirement is what the statute calls it—a requirement—and that
the penalty for its violation is what the statute calls it—a
penalty—the Government brings forward the flimsiest of
indications to the contrary. . . [W]hile the penalty is assessed and
collected by the IRS, § 5000A is administered both by that
agency and by the Department of Health and Human Services
(and also the Secretary of Veteran Affairs), which is responsible
for defining its substantive scope—a feature that would be quite
extraordinary for taxes.68
The four conservative dissenters further write that the Court had never
previously classified as a tax what the legislation itself calls a “penalty.”69
This is especially the case with the Act, where Congress never labeled the
“shared responsibility payment” a tax but labeled the exaction a “penalty” no
less than eighteen times in just one section of the Act.70
Calling the penalty a tax is also problematic because the penalty’s
purpose is solely to engender individual purchases of health insurance and
not to raise national government revenue.71 This distinguishes the mandate’s
penalty from sin taxes on alcohol and cigarettes and tariffs on imported
67. See id. at 2651–52 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (quoting Bailey v. Drexel
Furniture Co. (Child Labor Tax Case), 259 U.S. 20, 38 (1922)).
68. Id. at 2654 (internal citations omitted).
69. See id. at 2653.
70. See id.
71. See id.
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goods, which, although intended to engender differences in consumer
behavior, are also meant to enhance the public fisc.72
The four dissenting conservative justices write that calling the mandate a
tax is belied by the Act’s textual distinction between those who are exempted
from the individual mandate and those who are exempted from the penalty.73
They continue that “[i]f § 5000A were a tax, these two classes of exemption
would make no sense; there being no requirement, all the exemptions would
attach to the penalty (renamed tax) alone.” 74 The conservative justices
conclude that the “nail in the coffin” is the Act’s very structure, i.e., both
“the mandate and penalty are located in Title I of the Act, its operative core,
rather than where a tax would be found–in Title IX, containing the Act’s
‘Revenue Provisions.’”75
The dissenting conservatives conclude that to call the penalty a tax “is
not to interpret the statute but to rewrite it.”76 This rewrite is, from their
perspective, problematic both constitutionally, as the Constitution requires all
tax increases to originate in the House of Representatives, and from an
institutional competency perspective, as the legislature is more accountable
to the people and therefore should have the primary role in raising tax
revenue.77
Chief Justice Roberts saved the Act’s individual mandate by calling the
penalty a tax that is authorized under the Constitution’s Taxing and Spending
Clause. The penalty, however, is never described as a tax, does not operate
as a tax, and the Court’s jurisprudence had never previously countenanced
such a rewrite of Congressional legislation. Chief Justice Roberts’s decision
to authorize the individual mandate under the Taxing and Spending Clause
was most likely a political one based on an inclination to allow the Act to
survive judicial review.
C. The Decision Invalidates the Act’s Medicaid Mandate
Finally, the decision further weakens the national government’s power
with regard to the several States by invalidating the Act’s provision
mandating the States to increase their Medicaid rolls or lose the entirety of
their existing federal Medicaid funding. Medicaid is a federally subsidized
health care program that provides health care benefits to a limited class of
individuals whose incomes range from 37% to 63% of federal poverty
72. James Sadowsky, The Economics of Sin Taxes, 4(2) ACTON INST.: RELIGION & LIBERTY (Mar. &
Apr. 1994), http://www.acton.org/pub/religion-liberty/volume-4-number-2/economics-sin-taxes.
73. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2653 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 2655.
76. Id.
77. See id. (“Imposing a tax through judicial legislation inverts the constitutional scheme, and places
the power to tax in the branch of government least accountable to the citizenry.”).
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levels.78 The Act requires the States to use federal funds to increase their
Medicaid rolls to cover all persons whose incomes are below 133% of
federal poverty guidelines or, should they refuse to implement the federally
subsidized Medicaid expansion, lose the entirety their existing federal
Medicaid funds. 79 Chief Justice Roberts’s concluded that this was an
unconstitutional coercion of the several States. He writes:
Nothing in our opinion precludes Congress from offering funds
under the Affordable Care Act to expand the availability of health
care, and requiring that States accepting such funds comply with
the conditions on their use. What Congress is not free to do is to
penalize States that choose not to participate in that new program
by taking away their existing Medicaid funding. Section 1396c
gives the Secretary of Health and Human Services the authority to
do just that. It allows her to withhold all “further [Medicaid]
payments . . . to the State” if she determines that the State is out
of compliance with any Medicaid requirement, including those
contained in the expansion. In light of the Court's holding, the
Secretary cannot apply § 1396c to withdraw existing Medicaid
funds for failure to comply with the requirements set out in the
expansion.80
Indeed, Chief Justice Roberts’s characterized the provision in the Act
authorizing the Health and Human Services Secretary to withhold all
Medicaid funds from States that do not comply with the Act as “a gun to the
head.”81 He writes:
A State that opts out of the Affordable Care Act's expansion in
health care coverage thus stands to lose not merely “a relatively
small percentage” of its existing Medicaid funding, but all of it.
Medicaid spending accounts for over 20 percent of the average
State's total budget, with federal funds covering 50 to 83 percent
of those costs. The Federal Government estimates that it will pay
out approximately $3.3 trillion between 2010 and 2019 in order to
cover the costs of pre-expansion Medicaid. In addition, the States
have developed intricate statutory and administrative regimes
over the course of many decades to implement their objectives
under existing Medicaid. It is easy to see how the Dole Court
could conclude that the threatened loss of less than half of one
78.
79.
80.
81.

See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2601 (majority opinion).
See id.
Id. at 2607 (internal citation omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1396c (Supp. 2011)).
See id. at 2604.
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percent of South Dakota's budget left that State with a
“prerogative” to reject Congress's desired policy, “not merely in
theory but in fact.” The threatened loss of over 10 percent of a
State's overall budget, in contrast, is economic dragooning that
leaves the States with no real option but to acquiesce in the
Medicaid expansion.82
Chief Justice Roberts concluded that the requirement that States increase
their Medicaid rolls or risk losing their existing Medicaid federal funds
violates state sovereignty. This is regardless of the fact that the Medicaid
expansion is 100% funded by the federal government through 2016 and the
subsidy will never drop below 90% of the Medicaid expansion’s total
program cost.83
Why is the threat to remove existing Medicaid funding unconstitutional?
After all, the Act does not threaten to directly penalize State treasuries for
lack of compliance, but merely to deprive them of existing federal subsidies.
As noted in Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, Congress would have acted
constitutionally if it passed legislation ending all Medicaid subsidies to States
and then passed a new version of Medicaid that imposed the Act’s terms.84
In response, Chief Justice Roberts writes:
Justice Ginsburg suggests that the States can have no objection to
the Medicaid expansion, because “Congress could have repealed
Medicaid [and,] [t]hereafter, . . . could have enacted Medicaid II,
a new program combining the pre-2010 coverage with the
expanded coverage required by the ACA.” But it would certainly
not be that easy. Practical constraints would plainly inhibit, if not
preclude, the Federal Government from repealing the existing
program and putting every feature of Medicaid on the table for
political reconsideration. Such a massive undertaking would
hardly be “ritualistic.” The same is true of Justice Ginsburg’s
suggestion that Congress could establish Medicaid as an
exclusively federal program.85
Although Chief Justice Roberts is most certainly correct about the feasibility
of Justice Ginsburg’s counterfactual, it is not the Court’s place to evaluate
the constitutionality of a proposed scenario based on its political plausibility.
Indeed, as Justice Ginsberg sets forth in dissent, Congress could have simply

82.
83.
84.
85.

See id. at 2604–05 (internal citations omitted).
See id. at 2601.
See id. at 2636 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2606 n.14 (majority opinion) (internal citations omitted).
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cut the several States out of the Act’s Medicaid expansion and, as it did with
Social Security, constitutionally made it an entirely federal program.86
The Chief Justice, however, focused on the Act’s coercive threat to
withdraw existing federal Medicaid subsidies from States that refuse to
implement the Act’s Medicaid expansion. He distinguishes this coercion
from that found and upheld in South Dakota v. Dole. 87 Dole involved a
federal statute that directed the Secretary of Transportation to withhold 5% of
the federal highway funds otherwise payable to the State if the State allowed
for the sale of alcoholic beverages to persons less than twenty-one years
old. 88 South Dakota’s challenge to the statute under the Twenty-First
Amendment was rejected by the Court, which concluded that (1) Congress’s
age condition was directly related to safe interstate travel; (2) there was no
restriction on how the highway funds were to be used; and (3) the 5% penalty
constituted only “relatively mild encouragement to the States.”89 If anything,
however, the relevant statute in Dole is far more intrusive of state
sovereignty than the Act because, among other things, the Twenty-First
Amendment guarantees the States sole jurisdiction to regulate alcohol
consumption. Contrasting the Act with the applicable statute in Dole, Justice
Ginsberg writes:
The ACA, in contrast, relates solely to the federally funded
Medicaid program; if States choose not to comply, Congress has
not threatened to withhold funds earmarked for any other
program. Nor does the ACA use Medicaid funding to induce
States to take action Congress itself could not undertake. The
Federal Government undoubtedly could operate its own healthcare program for poor persons, just as it operates Medicare for
seniors' health care.90
The Chief Justice’s decision concluded the Medicaid expansion
improperly coerced states into expanding their Medicaid rolls because the
Act authorized the Health and Human Services Secretary to withhold
pre-expansion Medicaid subvention to recalcitrant States. 91 The Chief
Justice did this based on his own conservative and federalist jurisprudence.
The weakness with his position is that the Court’s most relevant precedent,
Dole, if anything, supports the Medicaid expansion’s constitutionality. As
noted in Justice Ginsberg’s dissent, Chief Justice Roberts’s conclusion is

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

See id. at 2632–33 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
483 U.S. 203 (1987).
See National Minimum Drinking Age Act, 23 U.S.C. § 158 (1984); 483 U.S. at 203.
See Dole, 483 U.S. at 211.
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2634 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See id. at 2608 (majority opinion).
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neither completely logical nor necessarily federalist.92 Congress could have
easily and constitutionally repealed the existing Medicaid program and
enacted a revised Medicaid program that required the expansion or “cut” the
States entirely out of a revised Medicaid program.93 Despite this, the Chief
Justice’s position is plausible, defensible, and consistent with his
conservative and federalist beliefs. Whatever else, Chief Justice Roberts
successfully used the decision as a means to align the Court’s jurisprudence
in this direction.
D. Severability
Chief Justice Roberts, however, saved the Act by severing the ostensibly
unconstitutional coercion of state sovereignty to leave the law’s remainder
intact. He writes:
The Court today limits the financial pressure the Secretary may
apply to induce States to accept the terms of the Medicaid
expansion. As a practical matter, that means States may now
choose to reject the expansion; that is the whole point. But that
does not mean all or even any will. Some States may indeed
decline to participate, either because they are unsure they will be
able to afford their share of the new funding obligations, or
because they are unwilling to commit the administrative resources
necessary to support the expansion. Other States, however, may
voluntarily sign up, finding the idea of expanding Medicaid
coverage attractive, particularly given the level of federal funding
the Act offers at the outset.94
In short, the Court “redrafted” the Act to authorize it under the Taxing and
Spending Clause and preserved the Medicaid expansion by using the Act’s
severability clause to allow States to opt out of the mandated Medicaid
expansion. As such, the Act will proceed into implementation and States can
now refuse to expand their Medicaid rolls without risking the loss of existing
federal Medicaid subvention.
Chief Justice Roberts succeeded in issuing a decision that sets the
Court’s jurisprudence in a markedly conservative and federalist direction
while avoiding a confrontation with the Executive and preserving the body’s
reputation for judicial restraint. This decision was facilitated by the Act’s
unique status as the most consequential piece of social welfare legislation
signed into law by any President since the Great Society, by the Obama
92. See id. at 2632–33 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
93. See id.
94. Id. at 2608 (majority opinion).
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Administration’s announced willingness to politicize the Court’s legitimacy
in the November 2012 election, and because the Act has focused the body
politic and therefore does not risk a ratchet-type federal government
expansion.
VI. THE DECISION’S CONSEQUENCES
On the very day the Court issued its decision affirming the Act’s
constitutionality, the President, speaking warmly of the decision, said:
Earlier today the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
the Affordable Care Act, the name of the health care reform we
passed two years ago. In doing so, they've reaffirmed a
fundamental principle: that here in America, in the wealthiest
nation on earth, no illness or accident should lead to any family's
financial ruin. . . .
....
The highest court in the land has now spoken. We will continue
to implement this law. And we'll work together to improve on it
where we can, but what we won't do, what the country can't
afford to do is refight the political battles of two years ago or go
back to the way things were. With today's announcement, it's
time for us to move forward, to implement and, where necessary,
improve on this law.95
The President’s positive reaction was joined by Democrat-leaning
columnists and pundits. In a column titled Taking One for the Country, the
New York Times chief foreign affairs columnist, Thomas Friedman, writes:
I know that this was a complex legal decision. But I think it was
inspired by a simple noble leadership impulse at a critical
juncture in our history—to preserve the legitimacy and integrity
of the Supreme Court as being above politics. We can’t always
describe this kind of leadership, but we know it when we see it
and so many Americans appreciate it.96

95. Lynn Sweet, Obama Reacts to Supreme Court: "What This Means for You" Transcript, CHI. SUNTIMES (June 28, 2012, 11:52 AM), http://blogs.suntimes.com/sweet/2012/06/obama_reacts_to_supreme_c
ourt_.html.
96. Thomas L. Friedman, Op-Ed., Taking One for the Country, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/01/opinion/sunday/taking-one-for-the-country.html.
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Similarly, the Washington Post columnist, E. J. Dionne, writes:
Roberts’ rulings on Citizens United and a variety of labor and
regulatory issues fed fears that he would happily take on the role
as the leader of a right-wing judicial revolution—and there is still
reason to worry that this is exactly what he'll do on many other
issues, notably affirmative action. But on health care, Roberts
chose to blunt these attacks. He cast himself as a jurist sensitive
to the obligation of the courts to show at least some deference to
the government's elected branches on matters of social policy. He
took what might have been a center-left decision upholding the
entire law and nudged it to the center or center-right. What he did
not do—and this is to his credit—was join the right end of the
court that wanted to gut the act.97
In short, Chief Justice Roberts’s decision meant the Obama
Administration and the liberal segment of the American political culture
accepted a decision that greatly narrowed the Commerce Clause, such that
the national government will find it difficult to pass social welfare
legislation to equalize what is presently one of the most unequal countries,
as measured by income, wealth, and life expectancy, in the developed
world.98
Recognizing this reality, some conservative columnists wrote flatteringly
of the Chief Justice’s decision notwithstanding their philosophical objections
with the Act. The very influential neoconservative Washington Post
columnist Charles Krauthammer, in a column titled Why Roberts Did It,
writes:
It’s the judiciary’s Nixon-to-China: Chief Justice John Roberts
joins the liberal wing of the Supreme Court and upholds the
constitutionality of Obamacare. How? By pulling off one of the
great constitutional finesses of all time. He managed to uphold
the central conservative argument against Obamacare, while at
the same time finding a narrow definitional dodge to uphold the
law—and thus prevented the court from being seen as having
overturned, presumably on political grounds, the signature
legislation of this administration.

97. E. J. Dionne, A Win for President Obama, and Chief Justice John Roberts, COM. APPEAL
(Memphis, Tenn.) (June 29, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://www.commercialappeal.com/news/2012/jun/29/awin-for-president-obama-and-chief-justice-john/.
98. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, SOCIETY AT A GLANCE 2011:
OECD
SOCIAL
INDICATORS
7,
66,
78
(6th
ed.
2011),
available
at
www.oecd.org/els/social/indicators/SAG.
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Why did he do it? Because he carries two identities.
Jurisprudentially, he is a constitutional conservative.
Institutionally, he is chief justice and sees himself as uniquely
entrusted with the custodianship of the court’s legitimacy,
reputation and stature.99
George F. Will writes:
By persuading the court to reject a Commerce Clause rationale
for a president’s signature act, the conservative legal insurgency
against Obamacare has won a huge victory for the long haul.
This victory will help revive a venerable tradition of America’s
political culture, that of viewing congressional actions with a
skeptical constitutional squint, searching for congruence with the
Constitution’s architecture of enumerated powers. By rejecting
the Commerce Clause rationale, Thursday’s decision reaffirmed
the Constitution’s foundational premise: Enumerated powers are
necessarily limited because, as Chief Justice John Marshall said,
“the enumeration presupposes something not enumerated.”100
This is not to say that reaction to the decision was unanimously positive.
Many conservative commentators and academicians were highly critical of
the Court’s decision, but political reaction from the right was muted and
reaction from the liberal left was overwhelmingly positive.
Most
importantly, the Chief Justice’s decision, by sustaining the Act, ensured the
Court’s legitimacy would not be an issue in the forthcoming Presidential
election. Rather, the election will focus on whether Americans should vote
for politicians who would, among other things, expand or repeal the Act.
Chief Justice Roberts, like his greatest predecessor, issued a decision that
furthered his jurisprudential objectives, enhanced the Court’s esteem, and
avoided a direct confrontation with the executive branch.
VII. CONCLUSION
Chief Justice Roberts’s decision effectively “threaded the needle” by
promulgating a decision that both avoids a direct confrontation with the
Obama Administration and greatly narrows the national government’s
powers vis-à-vis the several States. Notwithstanding select conservative
criticisms, Chief Justice Roberts’s decision enhances the Court’s legitimacy
99. Charles Krauthammer, Op. Ed., Why Roberts Did It, WASH. POST, June 28, 2012,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/charles-krauthammer-why-roberts-didit/2012/06/28/gJQA4X0g9V_story.html.
100. Will, supra note 62.
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and evidenced a measure of judicial restraint. Unlike his four conservative
brethren, Chief Justice Roberts surely recognized that overturning the Act
would have been the Court’s first decision to invalidate an Administration’s
chief legislative accomplishment on Commerce Clause grounds since the
New Deal era. Neither the Gun-Free School Zones Act101 in Lopez,102 nor
the Violence Against Women Act 103 in United States v. Morrison 104 were
significant legislative accomplishments for any Congress or President and the
Court’s invalidation of these statutes on Commerce Clause grounds did not
risk either its legitimacy or institutional prestige within the broader political
culture. The Court’s legitimacy and prestige, however, was affected in Bush
v. Gore when the Court decided the disposition of Florida’s electoral college
votes to determine the outcome of the 2000 Presidential election and when it
invalidated, on First Amendment grounds, many of the nation’s existing
campaign finance laws.105
The Court’s reputation would have been further eroded were it to have
invalidated the Act, which is the most significant piece of social welfare
legislation enacted since the Great Society era. In any event, the Act is the
type of legislation that focuses the political culture such that its ultimate fate
will be determined by the political process. Accordingly, conservatives can
rest assured that the decision will not risk a ratchet-type growth of federal
government power as perhaps might have been the case with the Gun-Free
School Zones Act and Violence Against Women Act in Lopez and Morrison,
respectively.
Chief Justice Roberts’s decision upholding the Act reminds us of our
greatest Chief Justice’s decision in Marbury that avoided a direct
confrontation with the Jefferson Administration to establish the Court’s
judicial review power over both executive and legislative actions and
adumbrated the Judiciary’s eventual status as an equal branch of the federal
government. Like his greatest predecessor, Chief Justice Roberts issued a
carefully reasoned decision that institutionally strengthens the Court, avoids
a potentially damaging fight with the executive branch, and furthers his own
jurisprudential goals.
The Chief Justice’s decision is based on logic that is far from foolproof.
His Commerce Clause jurisprudence is both activist and a marked departure
from the Court’s prior precedent to limit the national government’s power.
Moreover, his decision to avoid a confrontation with the Executive and
authorize the individual mandate’s penalty as a tax is both remarkable in its
101. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1988) (forbidding “any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at
a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone”).
102. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
103. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b) (1994) (stating that “persons within the United States shall have the right
to be free from crimes of violence motivated by gender”).
104. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
105. See 531 U.S. at 110.
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originality and tenuous based on the Court’s prior precedent and the Act’s
legislative history and text. However, the Chief Justice’s foremost duty, as
custodian of the Court, is to preserve the Court’s institutional prestige in the
broader American polity. After the Obama Administration signaled its
willingness to politicize the Court’s decision-making in the forthcoming
Presidential election, the Chief Justice’s role as custodian of the Court’s
reputation most likely took precedence over his inclination to invalidate the
law on both conservative and federalist principles. Notwithstanding both
legitimate and plausible jurisprudential objections to the decision from both
conservatives and liberals, Chief Justice Roberts issued a decision that both
protected the Court’s role as final arbiter of judicial disputes and left the
issue of how Americans use and distribute their increasingly scarce health
care resources to the political process. The decision, in the end, was an act of
patriotism.

